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ON A QUESTION OF KRAJEWSKI’S
FEDOR PAKHOMOV AND ALBERT VISSER
Abstract. In this paper we provide a (negative) solution to a problem posed
by Stanis law Krajewski. Consider a recursively enumerable theory U and a
finite expansion of the signature of U that contains at least one predicate sym-
bol of arity ≥ 2. We show that, for any finite extension α of U in the expanded
language that is conservative over U , there is a conservative extension β of U
in the expanded language, such that α ⊢ β and β 0 α. The result is pre-
served when we consider either extensions or model-conservative extensions
of U in stead of conservative extensions. Moreover, the result is preserved
when we replace ⊣ as ordering on the finitely axiomatized extensions in the
expanded language by a special kind of interpretability, to wit interpretability
that identically translates the symbols of the U-language.
We show that the result fails when we consider an expansion with only
unary predicate symbols for conservative extensions of U ordered by inter-
pretability that preserves the symbols of U .
Dedicated to Stanis law Krajewski.
1. Krajewski’s Question
At the Workshop on Formal Truth Theories in Warswaw, September 28–30, 2017,
Stanis law Krajewski asked the following question.
Consider any theory U of finite signature and suppose that U is
not finitely axiomatizable. We expand the language of U by finitely
many extra predicate symbols. Can there be a finitely axiomatized
α in the expanded language that conservatively extends U such
that there is no finitely axiomatized β that conservatively extends
U strictly ⊣-below α, i.e., such that α ⊢ β and β 0 α?
In this note, we prove that the answer is no for all U in case the expansion contains
at least one symbol of arity 2 or larger. In fact, we will prove the desired result as
one of several similar results, where, in stead of the relation of conservative exten-
sion, we can also read either extension or model-conservative extension and where
⊣ as ordering on finitely axiomatized extensions can be replaced by some special
kinds of interpretability, to wit: either parameter-free interpretability that identi-
cally preserves the symbols of U or interpretability with parameters that identically
preserves the symbols of U .
For the case that we expand with only unary symbols, we provide a class of ex-
amples that illustrate that the answer may be yes for the interpretability orderings.
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See Section 5. We show, in a sense, that there is just one finite way to say that
an ordering is infinite in the language of linear orderings plus finitely many extra
unary predicates. A consequence of our results is that the finite model property for
finitely axiomatized theories of linear order is decidable.
Kleene [Kle52] and Craig & Vaught [CV58] show that, in case U is recursively
enumerable and has no finite models, there is a finitely axiomatized α that conser-
vatively extends U in the language expanded with at least one relation symbol of
arity ≥ 2. Craig & Vaught prove an even stronger result where the finite theory
α that extends U is model-conservative over U . For completeness, we reprove the
result by Craig & Vaught below. See Section 3.
Craig and Vaught provide an example that shows that, in the case of only unary
expansion, there need not be a finitely axiomatized conservative extension. This
also follows by a result of Skolem that implies that there is no formula in the
language with identity and only unary predicate symbols that has only infinite
models —if it has any models at all.
In Appendix B, we provide some results in the environment of our problem.
2. Preliminaries
We work in languages with only relational symbols. This restriction is not really
a limitation since we can simulate the presence of terms using the well-known term-
unwinding algorithm. We work in languages with identity as logical symbol.
Suppose U is a theory of finite signature ΣU and let Θ be a finite signature
disjoint from ΣU . We use A,B, . . . for sentences of signature ΣU and α, β, . . . for
sentences of signature ΣU +Θ. We will confuse sentences with finitely axiomatized
theories. Thus, we will write, e.g., both α+A and (α ∧ A).
We write MΘ for the maximal arity of a symbol in Θ and |Θ| for the cardinality
of Θ.
2.1. Theories. We will employ a number of specific theories in our paper.
The theory INF is the theory in the language of identity that has, for every n, an
axiom that says ‘there are at least n elements’, or,
∃x0 . . . ∃xn−1
∧
i<j<n
xi 6= xj .
The theory LIN is the theory of linear order.
The theory S12 is the weak arithmetic of p-time computability. See, e.g., [Bus86] or
[HP93] for a description.
The theory AS or Adjunctive Set Theory has the following axioms.
AS1. ∃x∀y y 6∈ x
AS2. ∀x∀y ∃u ∀v (v ∈ u↔ (v ∈ x ∨ v = y)).
We refer the reader to [Vis13] for further information about AS.
We can interpret S12 in AS. We fix one such interpretation N . We can arrange it
so that assignments for formulas coded in N have desirable properties that make
a definition of satisfaction meaningful. We can also arrange that, in the obvious
interpretation of AS in the hereditarily finite sets, HF, the interpretation of N is
the standard numbers.
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Let a signature Σ be given. We define the finitely axiomatized theory CΣ in the
Σ-language expanded with one fresh binary relation symbol R as follows. Let
x ∈ y :↔ xRy ∧ ¬ yRy and sat(x, y) := ∃z (zRz ∧ 〈x, y〉Rz). Here 〈·, ·〉 is the
Kuratowski ∈-pairing. We take the following axioms for CΣ.
• AS plus extensionality for ∈.
• sat is a satisfaction predicate for the Σ-language with commutation condi-
tions for Σ-formulas coded in N .
It is easy to see that every countably infinite model of signature Σ can be expanded
to a model of CΣ. We will write CU for CΣU .
Remark 2.1. An alternative way to construct a functional equivalent of CΣ is to
expand Σ with two primitive predicates ∈ and sat and employ a theorem of Tarski
to reduce the two predicates to one in a definitionally equivalent way. See [Tar54].
This strategy is employed by Craig & Vaught in [CV58].
The theory TiS, or, tiny set theory, is defined as follows.
TiS1. Extensionality:
∀x∀y (x = y ↔ ∀z (z ∈ x↔ z ∈ y)).
TiS2. Restricted Adjunction of Elements:
∀x∀y ∀z (y ∈ z → ∃u ∀v (v ∈ u↔ (v ∈ x ∨ v = y))).
TiS3. Foundation for Sets:
∀x∀y (y ∈ x→ ∃z (z ∈ x ∧ ∀v (v ∈ z → v 6∈ x))).
We have that following insights.
Theorem 2.2. Let M be a finite model of TiS. Then, M is isomorphic with
〈℘X,∈〉, where X is a pure finite transitive set.
Proof. Consider a finite model M of TiS. Let m be a set in M with the maximal
number of elements. By TiS2, it follows that every element of some other set is
in m. Thus, either m is empty or its ∈-minimal element, guaranteed by TiS3, is
empty. Given that we have the empty set, we can use TiS2 to build any subset
of m. Clearly, from the external point of view, the relation ∈M restricted to the
set of all k such that k ∈M m is a transitive, well-founded and extensional binary
relation.
Thus, the set of k ∈M m equipped with ∈M is isomorphic to X equipped with ∈,
for some finite transitive set X . Hence, the modelM is isomorphic to the powerset
of X equipped with ∈. ✷
Theorem 2.3. Suppose S is a Σ01-sentence. There is a translation S 7→ S˜ of the
arithmetical to the set-theoretical set-theoretical Σ1-formulas, such that: S is true
iff, there is a pure transitive, hereditarily finite set X, such that 〈℘X,∈〉 |= S˜.
Proof. The proof is basically a careful translation of S to the set theoretical lan-
guage. One way of doing that is by using the realization in Barwise’s book [Bar17].
Barwise develops the theory of Σ-definability in KPU. We note that HF is a model of
KPU. First Barwise proves that any Σ-formula is equivalent to a Σ1-formula (The-
orem I.4.3). He gives ∆-definitions for predicates Nat(x) and ≤ (Section I.5). Also
he shows that the functions S (Section I.5), + and × are Σ-functions (Section I.6).
Finally, he proves that, if we extend the language of KPU by ∆-predicates (Lemma
I.5.2) and Σ-functions (Lemma I.5.4), then the extension will be conservative and
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each Σ-formula of the extended language will be equivalent to a Σ-formula of the
original.
The translation that we need is constructed from Barwise’s results as follows.
We first translate S to a pure Σ01-formula S
′ where all bounding terms are variables.
See, e.g., [Vis17, Section 3] for a sketch of how to do that. Then, we translate S′
to a Σ-formula S′′ in KPU conservatively extended by Nat, ≤, S, +, and ×. It
is obvious that this translated formula is true in HF (extended by definitions) iff
the original formula were true on standard natural numbers. Then, we obtain an
equivalent Σ-formula S′′′ of pure KPU and, finally, we get an equivalent Σ1-formula
S˜.
Alternatively, we could extract a mapping from the proof of [Bar17, Theorem I.2.3].
✷
The finite models of TiS can only have cardinalities that are powers of 2. This is
too restrictive for our purposes. We will need that, if our small set theory plus
S˜ has a finite model, then it has a model of any greater cardinality and that the
construction of this larger model is sufficiently uniform. There are many ways of
achieving this. We sketch two of them. The first is to allow elements with loops
in the domain. We replace TiS by its relativization to the elements a such that
a 6∈ a. Alternatively, we replace identity by extensional equivalence in the axioms.
We adopt this second strategy and describe it in a bit more detail.
Let us write a ≈ b for ∀x (x ∈ a↔ x ∈ b). We now define the theory:
TiS⋆1. Congruence:
∀x∀x′ ∀y ∀y′ ((x ≈ x′ ∧ y ≈ y′)→ (x ∈ y ↔ x′ ∈ y′)).
TiS⋆2. Restricted Adjunction of Elements:
∀x∀y ∀z (y ∈ z → ∃u ∀v (v ∈ u↔ (v ∈ x ∨ v ≈ y))).
TiS⋆3. Foundation for Sets:
∀x∀y (y ∈ x→ ∃z (z ∈ x ∧ ∀v (v ∈ z → v 6∈ x))).
We modify our mapping S 7→ S˜ by replacing = by ≈. Say the resulting formula is S˘.
We write [S] for TiS⋆+ S˘. It is clear that any model of [S] can be modified into an
[S]-model of greater cardinality simply by adding extra elements to a ≈-equivalence
class. We will return to this idea in the proof of Theorem 2.6.
Remark 2.4. Our use of TiS and TiS⋆ was inspired by Harvey Friedman’s use of
theories of a number in [Fri07].
2.2. Relations between Theories. Suppose Σ and Θ are two disjoint finite sig-
natures. A Σ,Θ-translation τ is given by a number p and a mapping that sends
the predicate symbols P of Θ of arity n to a formula π(~v, ~w) where the ~v, ~w are
pairwise-disjoint designated variables and ~v has length n and ~w has length p. The
translation τ can be lifted to all Σ,Θ-formulas in which the ~w do not occur as free
variables as follows:
• If P is a symbol from Σ: P τ (~x) :↔ τ(P )(~v, ~w)[~v := ~x], where we rename
bound variables in τ(P ) if in case they obstruct substitutability of the ~x.
• If Q is a symbol from Θ: Qτ (~x) :↔ Q(~x),
• (·)τ commutes with the logical connectives where we rename variables of
quantifiers if they would bind any of the ~w.
Let V and W be Σ,Θ-theories. An Σ,Θ-interpretation t : V → W , is given by
a Σ,Θ-translation τ and a parameter domain par
t
(~w) in the Σ,Θ-language. We
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demand that W ⊢ ∃~w par
t
(~w) and that, for all Σ,Θ-sentences α, if V ⊢ α, then
W ⊢ ∀~w (par
t
(~w)→ ατ ). An interpretation is parameter-free if the dimension p of
the parameter domain associated to its translation τ is zero. In case of parameter-
free interpretations, we will simply omit the parameter domain —since it is ⊤
modulo W -provable equivalence.
We writeW ◮ V (or, more officially,W ◮Σ,Θ V ) if there is an Σ,Θ-interpretation
t : V → W . We will always suppress the Σ,Θ-subscript since the relevant pair of
signatures is, in all cases, contextually given.
We write W ◮pf V if there is a parameter-free interpretation t : V →W .
We write αt for ατt , etcetera.
Remark 2.5. Kentaro Fujimoto in his paper [Fuj10] introduced the notion of
relative truth definability. This notion is our notion ◮pf restricted to expansions
with a truth predicate.
We have the following small insight.
Theorem 2.6. Consider any finitely axiomatized theory β. Then, W ◮ β iff, for
some translation τ , we have W ⊢ ∃~w βτ .
Proof. From left to right is immediate. From right to left, we take as parameter-
domain βτ . ✷
As a consequence it suffices, in case the target theory of an interpretability claim
is finitely axiomatized, to just specify the translation.
Remark 2.7. Mycielski, Pudla´k and Stern, in their fundamental paper [MPS90],
define interpretability with parameters in the style of Theorem 2.6 without a
parameter-domain.
We will need the following insight.
Theorem 2.8. Consider any true Σ01-sentence S. Suppose M is a model of TiS+
S˜N of cardinality n. Then, ∃x0 . . . , xn−1
∧
i<j<n xi 6= xj ◮ [S].
Proof. Suppose the domain of M is m0, . . . ,mn−1. We take as parameter-domain∧
i<j<n wi 6= wj . We take as translation:
• x ∼ y :↔
∧
1<i<n(x 6= wi ∧ y 6= wi) ∨
∨
1<i<n(x = wi ∧ y = wi).
• v0 R~w v1 :=
∨
{(v0 ∼ wi ∧ v1 ∼ wj) | i, j < n and RM(di, dj)}
It is easy to see that the resulting parameter-domain plus translation witness
∃x0 . . . , xn−1
∧
i<j<n xi 6= xj ◮ [S]. ✷
Here are some further notions.
• U ⊣c α iff α ⊢ U and, for all A, if α ⊢ A, then U ⊢ A. In case U ⊣c α, we
say that α is a conservative extension of U .
• U ⊣mc α iff α ⊢ U and every model of U can be expanded to a model of α.
In case α ⊣mc U , we say that α is a model-conservative extension of U .
• α ⊢–/ β iff α ⊢ β and β 0 α.
• α ◮–/ pf β iff α ◮pf β and β 6◮pf α.
• α ◮–/ β iff α ◮ β and β 6◮ α.
We note the following useful fact.
Fact 2.9. Let ⊑ be one of ⊣, ⊣c or ⊣mc. Let  be one of ⊣, ◭pf or ◭. Suppose
U ⊑ α and U ⊣ β  α. Then, U ⊑ β.
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3. Existence
In this section, we provide a proof of the Kleene-Craig-Vaught result. We also
provide some insights in its direct neighborhood.
Theorem 3.1 (Kleene-Craig-Vaught). Suppose U is a recursively enumerable the-
ory without finite models. We expand the signature of U with Θ with MΘ ≥ 2.
Then, there is an α such that U ⊣c α.
We note that if U has a finite conservative extension α, then U must be recursively
enumerable. So, the existence theorem is best possible as far as the complexity of
U is concerned.
Proof. We first treat the case where we expand U with a binary relation symbol
R. Let S(x) be a Σ01-formula that represents the theorems of U . Let true be the
truth-predicate that is based on the satisfaction predicate sat of the theory CU . Let
α := (CU ∧ ∀A ∈ sentNU (S
N (A)→ true(A))). Clearly α ⊢ U .
Consider any model M of U . Since the domain of M is infinite, we can clearly
expand this to a model that is HF as interpretation of ∈ and that yields modulo
arithmetization the standard satisfaction predicate as interpretation of sat.
We extend the result to any Θ with MΘ ≥ 2, by using any predicate P (~x ) of Θ of
arity ≥ 2 as replacement of R, using the first two argument places to mimic the
argument places of R and treating the remaining ones as dummies. We also treat
the remaining predicate symbols of Θ as don’t care. ✷
We show how to extend Theorem 3.1 to the case where U has only finitely many
finite models modulo isomorphism.
Lemma 3.2. Let U be a recursively enumerable theory. We expand the signature of
U with Θ with MΘ ≥ 2. Suppose that, for some A, we have U ⊣ A and U +¬A has
no finite models. Then, U has a finitely axiomatized model-conservative extension
α in the expanded language.
Proof. We apply Theorem 3.1 to U + ¬A. This gives us a β with U + ¬A ⊣mc β.
We show that U ⊣mc (A∨ β) =: α. Clearly, A∨ β ⊢ U . Let M be a model of U .
In case M |= A, we are done. In case M 6|= A, we have M |= U + ¬A. So, we can
expand M to a model of β, and we are, again, done. ✷
Theorem 3.3. Suppose U is a recursively enumerable theory and suppose U has
only finitely many finite models modulo isomorphism. We expand the signature of
U with Θ with MΘ ≥ 2. Then, for some α, we have U ⊣mc α.
Proof. We take A the disjunction of the model descriptions of the finite models of
U . It is easily seen that A satisfies the conditions of Lemma 3.2. ✷
We note that the set of finite models of a recursively enumerable theory might be
complete Π01. On the other hand, whenever U ⊢c α, the set of finite models for U
is NP, by Fagin’s theorem. See e.g. [Imm12]. So, not all recursively enumerable U
can have a finite extension α in an expanded language such that U ⊣c α.
Open Question 3.4. It there a recursively enumerable theory U with an NP set
of finite models (modulo isomorphism) such that there is no α with U ⊣c α?
Open Question 3.5. Can we find a recursively enumerable U and an α in an
expanded language, such that U ⊣c α, where there is no β such that U ⊣mc β?
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In case we work with languages without identity symbol, the situation changes,
since we could have U ⊣c α, where U has finite models and α has not. In fact, by
slightly modifying the proof of Theorem 3.1, we can, in the identity-free case, find
an α such that U ⊣c α, for any recursively enumerable U . We note that this last
observation does not hold for the case of ⊣mc. In this case the application of Fagin’s
Theorem still obtains.
In case we expand the language of U only with unary predicates, we need not be
able to find an α such that U ⊣c α, as shown in [CV58].
Finally, we consider what happens when we consider the relation ⊣ in stead of ⊣c
and ⊣mc. It is clear that we can always find an α such that U ⊣ α, to wit α := ⊥.
As a consolation, for those who find this example too trifling, we have the following
result.
Theorem 3.6. Suppose U is a consistent recursively enumerable theory. We ex-
pand the signature of U with a binary relation symbol R. Then, there is a consistent
α in the expanded language such that U ⊣ α.
Proof. Our theorem is a direct consequence of Theorem A.1 applied to the relations
⊣ of ⊑ and ⊣ for  and ⊥ as initial example of U ⊣ ⊥.
However, we can also reason as follows. Suppose U + INF is consistent. In that
case we can apply Theorem 3.1 to U + INT to obtain the desired consistent α. If
U + INF is inconsistent, U clearly only has models of size ≤ n, for some n. In this
case, U can be axiomatized by the disjunction of the model descriptions of its finite
models. We can now take this disjunction as our α. ✷
4. The Main Theorem
We formulate our main theorem.
Theorem 4.1. Consider any recursively enumerable theory U that is not finitely
axiomatizable and any finite expansion Θ of the signature of U with MΘ ≥ 2. Then,
for all U ⊣ α, there is a β with U ⊣ β ◭–\ α.
We note that Theorem 4.1 is not a direct answer to Krajewski’s question. However,
we will show, in Corollary 4.2, that the negative answer to Krajewski’s question is
an immediate consequence of Theorem 4.1.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. We first treat the case where Θ consists of a single binary
relation symbol R. At the end of the proof we will describe how to adapt the
argument to the more general case.
Suppose U is recursively enumerable and not finitely axiomatizable. We split the
proof in two cases:
A. There is no finitely axiomatizable sub-theory U0 of U such that U0 + INF ⊢ U .
B. There is a finitely axiomatizable sub-theory U0 of U such that U0 + INF ⊢ U .
We treat case (A). By Craig’s trick, we can find a ∆0(ω1) axiomatization axU of
U . Let true be the truth predicate derived from sat of CU .
Suppose U ⊣ α. We find a fixed point K such that, in the standard model, we
have K iff γ ◮ α, where K = ∃xK0(x) for K0 ∈ Σb1 and
γ :↔ CU ∧ ∃x ∈ N (K
N
0 (x) ∧ ∀y <
N x (axNU (y)→ true(x))).
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Our first order of business is to prove that K is false.
Suppose K were true. Let it be witnessed by k. Then, we have CU ⊢ (K0(k))N .
Using the commutation conditions it follows that:
U + CU ⊢ ∀y <
N k (axNU (y)→ true(x)).
Thus, U + CU ⊢ γ. By compactness, for some finite sub-theory U0 of U , we have
U0 + CU ⊢ γ.
Since K is true we have γ ◮ α. Suppose we have U ⊢ B, for any U -sentence B.
Then, α ⊢ B, and thus, γ ◮ B. Since B is in the U -language, we find γ ⊢ B. Since
B was an arbitrary consequence of U , we find γ ⊢ U and, hence, U0+CU ⊢ U . Since,
every model of U0+ INF can be expanded to a model of CU , we have U0+ INF ⊢ U ,
quod non, by assumption (A).
We have shown that γ 6◮ α. The falsity of K also implies that γ ⊢ U , since γ
knows of every standard number that it is not a witness of K. It follows that
U ⊣ (α ∨ γ) ◭ α and (α ∨ γ) 6◮ α. So, U ⊣ (α ∨ γ) ◭–\ α. Thus, we can take
β := (α ∨ γ).
We treat case (B). We suppose, in order to obtain a contradiction, that α⋆ is
◭-minimal such that U ⊣ α⋆.
Let A be a sentence axiomatizing a finitely axiomatizable sub-theory U0 of U
such that U0 + INF ⊢ U . We find, using the Go¨del Fixed Point Lemma, a Σ01-
sentence K such that, in the standard model, K iff (A∧ [K]) ◮ α⋆. Here we use R
in the role of ∈.
We claim that K is false. Suppose K is true. Then, we have a finite model of
TiS+ S˜N of size, say, n. By Theorem 2.8, we have:
(A+ ∃x0 · · · ∃xn−1
∧
i<j<n
xi 6= xj) ◮ (A+ [K]).
Since (A ∧ [K]) ◮ α⋆, we find:
(†) (A+ ∃x0 · · · ∃xn−1
∧
i<j<n
xi 6= xj) ◮ α
⋆.
Let us write DM for the U -sentence describing the existence of a finite ΣU -model
M. We have:
U + ∀x0 · · · ∀xn−1
∨
i<j<n
xi = xj ⊢
∨
{DM | M is a U -model of cardinality < n}
Since DM ⊢ U , it follows, by the ◭-minimality of α⋆, that DM ◮ α⋆. Ergo,
(‡) (U + ∀x0 · · · ∀xn−1
∨
i<j<n
xi = xj) ◮ α
⋆.
We may conclude from (†) and (‡) that U ◮ α⋆.
We find that, for some finitely axiomatized U1 ⊆ U , we have U1 ◮ α⋆ ⊢ U . It
follows that U1 ⊢ U , in contradiction to the fact that U is not finitely axiomatizable.
Thus, K is false.
Since K is false, we have (A ∧ [K]) 6◮ α⋆. Moreover, A + [K] ⊢ A + INF ⊢ U . It
follows that β := (α⋆ ∨ (A ∧ [K])) is ◭–\ -below α
⋆ and ⊣-above U . A contradiction.
We can easily extend our proof to the general case where Θ is finite and MΘ ≥
2. We simply choose one predicate symbol P with arity ≥ 2. We use the first
ON A QUESTION OF KRAJEWSKI’S 9
two argument places of P to simulate the argument places of R. The remaining
argument places are treated as dummy variables. All other predicate symbols in Θ
are don’t care. ✷
We can now answer Krajewski’s question.
Corollary 4.2. Consider any theory U that is not finitely axiomatizable and any
finite expansion Θ of the signature of U with MΘ ≥ 2. Then, for all α with U ⊣c α,
there is a β with U ⊣c β ⊣–\ α.
We note that, unlike in the case of Theorem 4.1, we do not need to demand that U
is recursively enumerable. If the theory has a finite conservative extension at all,
then the theory is automatically recursively enumerable.
Proof. Suppose U that is not finitely axiomatizable. Let Θ be an expansion of the
signature of U with MΘ ≥ 2. Suppose U ⊣c α. It follows that U is recursively
enumerable and U ⊣ α, and, hence, by Theorem 4.1, there is a γ with U ⊣ γ ◭–\ α.
Let β := (α ∨ γ). Clearly, U ⊣ β ⊣ α. Suppose that we would have β ⊢ α. Then, it
would follow that γ ⊢ α. From this, we get γ ◮ α. Quod non. Hence β ⊣–\ α. Finally,
since a sub-theory of a conservative theory is conservative, we have U ⊣c β. ✷
In fact we can do more than Corollary 4.2. We can replace ⊣ in Theorem 4.1 by
any of ⊣c or ⊣mc and we can replace ◭ by any of ⊣ or ◭pf . In all these cases, we
obtain a valid theorem. The reasoning for the seven further cases is fully analogous
to the reasoning for Theorem 4.2. We spell this out in Appendix A.
We end this Section with some questions.
Open Question 4.3. Consider any theory U that is not finitely axiomatizable and
any finite expansion Θ of the signature of U with MΘ ≥ 2.
Suppose α is not interpretable (in the full sense of interpretability) in U . Is there
an extension β of U , such that α is not interpretable in β?
Open Question 4.4. Consider any theory U that is not finitely axiomatizable and
any finite expansion Θ of the signature of U with MΘ ≥ 2.
We take as the length of a proof the number of symbols in the proof written in
a fixed finite alphabet. We define β sp α iff there is a polynomial P (x) such that,
for every A (of the language of U), if A is provable from β by a proof of the length
n, then A is provable from α by a proof of length ≤ P (n).
Can there be a sp-minimal conservative extension α⋆ of U?
5. The Case of Unary Predicates
In this section, we provide an example of a class of theories U such that, in the
language expanded with a non-empty finite signature of unary predicate symbols,
we have a ◭pf-minimal α
⋆ such that U ⊣mc α⋆.
Let LIN be the theory of linear order. Suppose Θ is a finite signature consisting of
unary predicate symbols and let P be a designated symbol in Θ. We take Λ to be
the signature of the theory of order extended with Θ. Let UB(P ) be the property
of P that P defines a non-empty set that either does not have a minimal element
or does not have a maximal element. More formally:
• UB(P ) :↔ ∃xP (x) ∧
(∀y (P (y)→ ∃z (P (z) ∧ y < z)) ∨ ∀y (P (y)→ ∃z (P (z) ∧ z < y))).
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The main theorem of this section is as follows.
Theorem 5.1. Suppose Θ is a non-empty finite signature consisting of unary pred-
icate symbols and let P be in Θ. Suppose A is a finite extension of LIN and let
U := A+ INF. We take α⋆ := (A ∧ UB(P )). We have:
a. U ⊣mc α⋆.
b. For all α such that U ⊣ α, we have α⋆ ◭pf α.
So, in a sense, the theorem tells us that, in the extended language, there is only
one finite way to say that we exclude finite models of A. We note that Theorem 5.1
with ◭pf replaced by ◭ follows from Theorem 5.1. However the following is open.
Open Question 5.2. Is there an example of a theory U and an α in the language
of U extended with a non-empty finite signature of unary predicate symbols, such
that α is a ⊣-minimal conservative extension of U?
We prove (a) of Theorem 5.1 now and postpone the proof of (b) until we have done
some preparatory work.
Proof of Theorem 5.1(a). Consider any infinite model N of A. Since N cannot be
both well-founded and converse well-founded, we can find the desired interpretation
of P . ✷
We start our prepratory work with a theorem on linear orderings. Consider the
theory LIN of linear order. We extend the signature of LIN. with a signature Θ
consisting of finitely many unary predicate symbols. Say the resulting signature
is Λ. As usual, we let α, β, . . . range over Λ-language We add two two unary
predicates △0 and △1 to the Λ-language. We write α
△i for the result of relativizing
all quantifiers in α to △i. We add the following axioms to LIN:
• ∀x (△0(x)↔ ¬△1(x)).
• ∀x∀y ((△0(x) ∧ y < x)→ △0(y)).
Note that we allow the △i to be empty. Relativization to the empty domain is as
expected: an existential sentence relativized to the empty domain is false and a
universal one is true.
Say the resulting theory (in the language of signature Λ(△0,△1)) is LIN
split. Con-
sider a formula α. Let ~x; ~y be a partition in two parts of a finite set of variables.
Let the context C(~x; ~y) be a conjunction of all formulas △0(xi) and △1(yj).
Theorem 5.3. Consider a formula α(~x, ~y) with all free variables shown. Then,
over LINsplit+C(~x; ~y), the formula α(~x, ~y) is equivalent to a boolean combination of
formulas of the form η△0(~x) (all free variables shown) and θ△1(~y) (all free variables
shown).
Proof. The proof is by induction on α. For the atomic case, we have:
• LINsplit + △0(x) ∧ △1(y) ⊢ x < y ↔ ⊤.
• LINsplit + △0(x) ∧ △1(y) ⊢ y < x↔ ⊥.
• LINsplit + △0(x0) ∧ △0(x1) ⊢ x0 < x1 ↔ x0 < x1.
• LINsplit + △1(y0) ∧ △1(y1) ⊢ y0 < y1 ↔ y0 < y1.
• LINsplit + △0(x) ⊢ P (x)↔ P (x).
• LINsplit + △1(y) ⊢ P (y)↔ P (y).
• Similary, for further unary predicates.
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Preservation of the desired property under the propositional connectives is trivial.
We treat the case of the existential quantifier. Suppose α = ∃uα0(u, ~x, ~y). After
some rewriting we have:
• LINsplit + C(u, ~x; ~y) ⊢ α0(u, ~x, ~y)↔
∨
i<n(η
△0
i (u, ~x) ∧ θ
△1
i (~y)).
• LINsplit + C(~x;u, ~y) ⊢ α0(u, ~x, ~y)↔
∨
j<m(κ
△0
i (~x) ∧ ν
△1
i (u, ~y)).
So, we have:
LINsplit + C(~x; ~y) ⊢ ∃uα0(u, ~x, ~y) ↔ ∃u (△0(u) ∧ α0(u, ~x, ~y)) ∨
∃u (△1(u) ∧ α0(u, ~x, ~y))
↔ ∃u (△0(u) ∧
∨
i<n
(η△0i (u, ~x) ∧ θ
△1
i (~y))) ∨
∃u (△1(u) ∧
∨
j<m
(κ△0i (~x) ∧ ν
△1
i (u, ~y)))
↔
∨
i<n
(∃u (△0(u) ∧ η
△0
i (u, ~x)) ∧ θ
△1
i (~y)) ∨
∨
j<m
(κ△0i (~x) ∧ ∃u (△1(u) ∧ ν
△1
i (u, ~y)))
↔
∨
i<n
((∃u ηi(u, ~x))
△0 ∧ θ△1i (~y)) ∨
∨
j<m
(κ△0i (~x) ∧ (∃u νi(u, ~y))
△1)
So, we are done. (We note that the calculation also works when one of the domains
is empty.) ✷
Let α be a sentence of signature Λ with LIN ⊣ α. Let ηi, for i < n and θj , for
j < ℓ, be the sentences produced for α in Theorem 5.1. Let s be a 0, 1-sequence of
of length ℓ. We write y ∈ (x,∞) for x < y. We define:
• βs(x) is the conjunction of the sentences θ
(x,∞)
j when sj = 1 and
¬ θ
(x,∞)
j if sj = 0.
We will say that x witnesses s for βs(x). We note that each x witnesses a unique
s. We define the theory Fα as follows.
Fα1. α
Fα2. ∃x∀y x ≤ y (Zero)
Fα3. ∀x∀y (x < y → ∃z (x < z ∧ ∀u (x < u→ z ≤ u))) (Restricted Successor)
Fα4. ∃xβs(x)→ ∃x (βs(x) ∧ ∀y (x < y → ¬βs(y))), for each s : ℓ→ 2.
(If s has a witness at all, it has a largest witness.)
Theorem 5.4. Let α be a sentence in the language of linear orderings expanded
with finitely many unary predicate symbols. Suppose LIN ⊣ α. Then, α has a finite
model iff Fα is consistent.
Proof. The left-to-right direction is immediate.
We prove right-to-left. Suppose Fα is consistent. Then, Fα has a model N . We
write n(N ) for the number of s that are witnessed infinitely often in N . LetM be
a model of Fα such that n(M) is minimal. Suppose M is infinite.
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The model M begins with a copy of ω. By the pigeon-hole principle, there is an
s∗ that is witnessed infinitely often in this copy of ω. Clearly, the initial copy of ω
contains a smallest witness a of s∗. Let b be the maximal witness of s∗.
We now remove the interval (a, b] from M, thus obtaining a new model M′.
We claim that M′ again satisfies Fα.
To prove (Fα1), we note that: M |= η
[0,a]
i iff M
′ |= η
[0,a]
i . Moreover, we have
M |= θ
(a,∞)
j iff M |= θ
(b,∞)
j , and M |= θ
(b,∞)
j iff M
′ |= θ
(a,∞)
j . So, M |= θ
(a,∞)
j iff
M′ |= θ
(a,∞)
j . Hence, M
′ |= α.
The preservation of (Fα2) and (Fα3) is immediate.
Finally, consider any s that is witnessed inM′. In case s only hasM′-witnesses
in [0, a] we are done, since [0, a] is finite. In case s has an M′-witness in (a,∞),
then it has an M-witness in (a,∞), since the question whether c is a witness only
depends on what happens above c. It follows that s has a maximal M-witness in
(a,∞), and, hence, s has a maximal M′-witness in (a,∞). This gives us (Fα4).
We note that if s is witnessed infinitely often inM′, then it witnessed infinitely often
in M. On the other hand, s∗ is not witnessed in (b,∞), so it is only witnessed
finitely often in M′. Thus, n(M′) < n(M). This contradicts the minimality of
n(M).
We may conclude that M must be finite. ✷
Since, Theorem 5.4 tells us that the property of α having a finite model is both
recursively enumerable and co-recursively enumerable, we have the following corol-
lary.
Corollary 5.5. Suppose α is a sentence in the language of LIN expanded with
finitely many unary predicate symbols and LIN ⊣ α. Then, it is decidable whether
α has a finite model.
Open Question 5.6. Suppose α is a sentence in the language of LIN expanded
with finitely many unary predicate symbols and LIN ⊣ α. Is there a better algorithm
than the one suggested for Corollary 5.5 to determine whether α has a finite model?
We write:
• γ〈δ〉θ iff (γ ∧ δ) ∨ (θ ∧ ¬ δ).
Thus, γ〈δ〉θ means: γ if δ, else θ.
We are now ready and set to prove Theorem 5.1(b).
Proof of Theorem 5.1(b). Let LIN ⊣ A, U := A + INF and α⋆ := (A + UB(P )).
Suppose α ⊢ U and, suppose, to get a contradiction, that (‡) α 6◮pf α⋆. We note
that this is equivalent to α 6◮pf UB(P ), since A is in the <-language.
We show that the theory W := α + {¬UB(φ) | φ ∈ Form1Λ} is consistent. Here
Form1Λ is the set of Λ-formulas with at most the variable v free. Suppose W were
inconsistent. Then, by compactness, we would have α ⊢
∨
i<k UB(φi), for some k
and for some choice of the φi.
Let ψ := φ0〈UB(φ0)〉(φ1〈UB(φ1)〉(. . .)). Clearly, it would follow that α ⊢ UB(ψ)
and, hence, α ◮pf UB(P ). Quod non, by Assumption (‡).
LetM be a model ofW . In W every definable non-empty set has both a maximum
and a minimum. We verify that M satisfies Fα. Clearly M satisfies (Fα1) and
ON A QUESTION OF KRAJEWSKI’S 13
(Fα2). Suppose a is not maximal and a has no direct successor. Then, there is a
minimal such element a⋆. Since a⋆ is definable, there is a least b > a⋆. But this b
must be the direct successor of a⋆. A contradiction. So, every non-maximal a has
a direct successor. This gives us (Fα3). Finally, (Fα4) is again immediate.
We have shown that Fα is consistent and, hence, by Theorem 5.4, has a finite
model. A contradiction. We may conclude that Assumption (‡) is false. ✷
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Appendix A. Proof of Nine Cases
We formulate the generalized version of our main theorem.
Theorem A.1. Consider any recursively enumerable theory U that is not finitely
axiomatizable and any finite expansion Θ of the signature of U with MΘ ≥ 2. Let
⊑ be one of ⊣, ⊣c, ⊣mc and let  be one of ⊣, ◭pf or ◭.
Then, for all α ⊒ U , there is a β with α ≻ β ⊒ U .
We note that Theorem A.1 tells us that if U is not finitely axiomatizable, then
there is no -has no minimal element, if ⊑ is one of ⊣, ⊣c, ⊣mc and if  is one of
⊣, ◭pf or ◭. Since the α are closed under infima, an element is minimal iff it is a
minimum. Thus, Theorem A.1 tells us that, if U is not finitely axiomatizable, then
the α such that U ⊑ α have no minimum.
14 FEDOR PAKHOMOV AND ALBERT VISSER
The following two lemmas allow us to derive the nine cases of Theorem A.1 from
Theorem 4.1.
Lemma A.2. Suppose:
i. For all α, we have: if U ⊑0 α, then U ⊣ α.
ii. For all α, we have: if U ⊑1 α, then U ⊑0 α.
iii. For all α, β, we have: if U ⊑1 α and U ⊣ β  α, then U ⊑1 β.
Suppose (a): for all α such that U ⊑0 α, there is a β with U ⊑0 β ≺ α. Then, we
have (b): for all α such that U ⊑1 α, there is a β with U ⊑1 β ≺ α.
Proof. Suppose we have (a) and U ⊑1 α. Then, by (ii), U ⊑0 α. Thus, by (a),
there is a β with U ⊑0 β ≺ α. By (i), we find U ⊣ β ≺ α. Since, U ⊑1 α, we may
conclude, by (iii), that U ⊑1 β ≺ α. ✷
Lemma A.3. Suppose:
i. For all α and β, we have: if β ⊣ α, then β 1 α.
ii. For all α and β, we have: if β 1 α, then β 0 α.
iii. 1 is transitive.
iv. For all α, if U ⊑ α, then U ⊣ α.
v. For all α and β, if U ⊑ α and U ⊣ β ⊣ α, then U ⊑ β.
Suppose (a): for all α such that U ⊑ α, there is a β with U ⊑ β ≺0 α. Then, we
have (b): for all α such that U ⊑ α, there is a β with U ⊑ β ≺1 α.
Proof. Suppose we have (a) and U ⊑ α. Then, by (a), there is γ with U ⊑ γ ≺0 α.
We find β := (α ∨ γ) ⊣ α. Hence, by (i), β 1 α.
Suppose we would have α 1 β. We have, β ⊣ γ, and, hence, by (i), β 1 γ. So,
by (iii), we would have α 1 γ. But then, by (ii), we would have α 0 γ. Quod
non. We may conclude that β ≺ α.
Finally, we have U ⊑ α and U ⊑ γ. Hence, by (iv), U ⊣ α and U ⊣ γ. It follows
that U ⊣ β ⊣ α. But then, by (v), we have U ⊑ β. ✷
Proof. Proof of Theorem A.1 We note that, if we interpret  as any of ⊣, ◭pf
or ◭, then any of the pairs ⊣,⊣c and ⊣c,⊣mc satisfies the assumptions (i)-(iii) of
Lemma A.2. By applying Lemma A.2, we find that in order to prove Theorem A.1,
it suffices to prove the cases where ⊑ is ⊣.
We also note that, if we interpret ⊑ as any of ⊣, ⊣c or ⊣mc, then any of the pairs
◭pf ,⊣ and ◭,◭pf satisfies the assumptions (i)-(v) of Lemma A.3. By applying
Lemma A.3, we find that in order to prove Theorem A.1, it suffices to prove the
cases where  is ◭.
Thus, we may conclude that we have Theorem A.1. ✷
Appendix B. Some Results in the Environment of Our Problem
The following result is Theorem 5.3 of [VisXX].
Theorem B.1. Let A and U be theories, where A is finitely axiomatized and U is
recursively enumerable and sequential. Suppose A ✄–/ U . Then, there is a finitely
axiomatized theory B such that A ✄–/ B ✄–/ U . Moreover, if A is sequential, B is
sequential too.
Open Question B.2. Can we extend Theorem B.1 to a wider class of theories U?
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The following result is Theorem 2 of [Vis17]. The theory R is the Tarski-Mostowski-
Robinson theory R from [TMR53].
Theorem B.3. Suppose R ⊆ A, where A is finitely axiomatized and consistent.
Then, there is a finitely axiomatized B such that R ⊆ B ⊆ A and B 6✄ A.
Example B.4. It is very well possible that a non-finitely axiomatizable theory has
a minimal finite extension in the same language w.r.t. ⊣. An example is Peano
Arithmetic that has the inconsistent theory as its only finite extension in the same
language.
If the reader objects to having the inconsistent theory as an example, let e.g. A
be the conjunction of the axioms of EA plus ✷PA⊥. Let U be the theory axiomatized
by axiomsB∨A, whereB is an axiom of PA. ClearlyA is a finite consistent extension
of U . Suppose C is another such extension. We note that C ∧ ¬A extends PA, so
C ∧ ¬A ⊢ ⊥ and, hence, C ⊢ A.
Appendix C. List of Questions
Q1. It there a recursively enumerable theory U with an NP set of finite models
(modulo isomorphism) such that there is no α with U ⊣c α? (This is Ques-
tion 3.4.)
Q2. Can we find a recursively enumerable U and an α in an expanded language,
such that U ⊣c α, where there is no β such that U ⊣mc β? (This is Ques-
tion 3.5.)
Q3. Consider any theory U that is not finitely axiomatizable and any finite expan-
sion Θ of the signature of U with MΘ ≥ 2. Suppose α is not interpretable (in
the full sense of interpretability) in U . Is there an extension β of U , such that
α is not interpretable in β? (This is Question 4.3.)
Q4. Consider any theory U that is not finitely axiomatizable and any finite expan-
sion Θ of the signature of U with MΘ ≥ 2. We take as the length of a proof the
number of symbols in the proof written in a fixed finite alphabet. We define
β sp α iff there is a polynomial P (x) such that, for every A (of the language
of U), if A is provable from β by a proof of the length n, then A is provable
from α by a proof of length ≤ P (n). Can there be a sp-minimal conservative
extension α⋆ of U? (This is Question 4.4.)
Q5. Is there an example of a theory U and an α in the language of U extended
with a non-empty finite signature of unary predicate symbols, such that α is
a ⊣-minimal conservative extension of U? (This is Question 5.2.)
Q6. Suppose α is a sentence in the language of LIN expanded with finitely many
unary predicate symbols and LIN ⊣ α. Is there a better algorithm than the one
suggested for Corollary 5.5 to determine whether α has a finite model? (This
is Question 5.6.)
Q7. Can we extend Theorem B.1 to a wider class of theories U? (This is Ques-
tion B.2.)
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